S. Frederick Starr

March 20, 2025

This article was originally delivered as a speech in March 2025 at an Asian Development Bank conference on connectivity and trade under their Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation Program. 

Read Coordinating the Corridors (PDF)

Nargiza Umarova

March 12, 2025

In the current geopolitical realities, Central Asia seeks to restore its historical role as a land-based transportation and logistics hub, facilitating connections between East and West, as well as North and South. Most of the region’s countries promote their own projects including railways, gas pipelines, and power lines through Afghanistan, which offer them substantial economic and geopolitical advantages. However, the intervention of major powers, including Russia, China, India, and Iran, could create a serious conflict of interest on the trans-Afghan track. To mitigate risks, Central Asian states should implement a coordinated policy for developing the southern transit direction on a mutually beneficial basis.

Read What the Extension of Transport Corridors in Afghanistan Means for Central Asia (PDF) 

By Aigerim Turgunbaeva and Fayazuddin Ghiasi

On February 22, 2025, during a meeting with Uzbekistan'ss Prime Minister Abdullah Aripov, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar Akhund, representing the Taliban, called for Uzbek investment in repairing crucial infrastructure, including the Mazar-e-Sharif–Herat railway and the second Salang tunnel. These projects are seen as vital for improving communication and trade between Central and South Asia. Baradar reaffirmed the Taliban's commitment to regional stability and enhancing economic relations, while Uzbekistan expressed support for deepening cooperation and advancing joint initiatives. The Taliban's diplomacy in Central Asia is increasingly focused on economic cooperation, prioritizing infrastructure development and trade expansion.

BACKGROUND: Following the 9/11 attacks, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) entered Afghanistan, and Central Asian countries aligned with the US by providing military support, road access, and airspace. Initially, these countries opposed the Taliban, backing anti-Taliban movements. However, over time, as the Taliban adapted their strategy and reduced their overt support for Central Asian militant groups, some regional countries shifted to a more neutral stance on Afghanistan.

During the Doha peace process, delegates from Central Asian countries held several meetings with the Taliban negotiating team, laying the groundwork for post-U.S. withdrawal relations. When American forces withdrew in August 2021, the Taliban regained control, creating security concerns for neighboring Central Asian states. This shift in power forced regional actors to reassess their approach, balancing security risks with economic and geopolitical interests.

Despite these concerns, most of Central Asian countries kept their embassies open in Kabul and initiated political and economic engagement with the Taliban. For its part, the Taliban, facing a financial crisis due to sanctions, frozen assets, reduced foreign aid, a water crisis, and a lack of international recognition, pursued an economic-oriented foreign policy. This included announcing expanding transportation infrastructure, such as the Mazar-e-Sharif-Herat-Kandahar railway corridor (1,468 km), approved in May 2023, and the Spin Boldak-Kandahar railway, set to connect Central Asia to South Asia in 2024.

IMPLICATIONS: The Taliban’s return to power has significantly reshaped regional geopolitics and economic ties. With the US withdrawal creating a power vacuum, regional actors have sought to strengthen their positions. The Taliban, in turn, have sought new partnerships to break their political and economic isolation.

As Central Asian nations engage with the Taliban while remaining wary of potential instability, they have also strengthened ties with other powers like China and Russia. This shifting landscape raises critical questions about Afghanistan's evolving role in the region, particularly in terms of security cooperation, counterterrorism efforts, and border management.

Uzbekistan was the first Central Asian country to host a Taliban delegation, receiving Acting Deputy Prime Minister Mawlawi Abdul Salam Hanafi in Termez in September 2021. Both sides signed a security and trade protocol, exchanged diplomats, and expanded economic relations. On April 13, 2023, Uzbekistan hosted the 4th meeting of Afghanistan’s neighboring foreign ministers in Samarkand to discuss the Afghan situation.

As the Russia-Ukraine war disrupts trade, Uzbekistan—where three of its eight transit corridors depend on Russia—has accelerated efforts to find alternative routes. In August 2024, the Uzbek Prime Minister visited Kabul to discuss trade and investment projects, resulting in 35 MoUs worth $2.5 billion. Trade between the two countries reached $860 million. Additionally, Uzbekistan has played a key role in infrastructure development, co-signing a trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and Pakistan in July 2023 for the Trans-Afghan Railway, linking Mazar-e-Sharif to Pakistan’s ports, with a projected cost of $6 billion.

In February 2025, Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar led a high-ranking Taliban delegation to Uzbekistan to deepen economic, trade, and transport cooperation. Tashkent also committed to completing the "Khalqlaar Bazar" border market and providing Afghan citizens with a 15-day visa-free regime.

As for Kazakhstan, Afghanistan's top wheat, flour, and edible oil supplier, it maintained its embassy in Kabul after the Taliban’s takeover. Both sides exchanged ambassadors, strengthening diplomatic ties. Since 2023, three business forums in Astana, Almaty, and Kabul have facilitated agreements worth $1.5 billion. In April 2024, Kazakhstan’s Prime Minister led a delegation to Kabul for an Afghanistan-Kazakhstan business forum, exploring investment in the chemical, mining, and metallurgical industries. Bilateral trade grew to $700 million in 9 months of  2024, a 14% increase from 2023, with projections reaching $3 billion in five years.

Kazakhstan also joined Turkmenistan’s initiative to build a logistics hub in Herat and expressed interest in the Trans-Afghan Railway, initially agreed upon by the Taliban, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan in 2021, to access South Asian and Gulf markets.

Historically neutral, Turkmenistan has maintained close ties with the Taliban since the 1990s. It remains a major oil and gas supplier to Afghanistan, with trade valued at over $500 million. Turkmen investments in Afghanistan exceed $1.5 billion, including infrastructure projects such as the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (TAPI) gas pipeline. In 2024, top Taliban officials met Turkmen leaders to resume work on TAPI, sign MoUs worth $200 million, and explore oil and gas transit routes linking Russia to South Asia via Afghanistan. Additionally, the two sides signed a $7 million agreement for three railway projects in September 2024.

With a 1,360 km border with Afghanistan, Tajikistan was initially the most vocal opponent of the Taliban, demanding an inclusive government with ethnic and gender representation. Anti-Taliban figures gathered in Tajikistan, drawing criticism from Kabul. However, economic cooperation persisted, with Tajikistan continuing electricity exports and opening five joint border markets in September 2023. The Jalaluddin Mohammad Balkhi-Sher Khan Port railway project, first signed in 2019, resumed, enhancing connectivity with Central Asia. Trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan reached $120 million in 2024. A recent unofficial meeting between top Tajik security officials and the Taliban signaled a thaw in relations.

Concerned about the rights of the Afghan Kyrgyz minority in the Pamir region, Kyrgyzstan established early contacts with the Taliban. In September 2021, Deputy Chairman of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council Taalatbek Masadykov met with the Taliban Foreign Minister. Trade and transit discussions continued, with Kyrgyzstan serving as a transit route for Afghan goods to China and playing a key role in the CASA-1000 electricity transmission project.

In September 2024, Kyrgyzstan’s Cabinet Chairman Akylbek Japarov met with Taliban representatives, expressing interest in expanding trade, transportation, energy, and agriculture cooperation. Some Afghan Kyrgyz, facing economic hardship and limited educational opportunities, have requested relocation to Kyrgyzstan. In response, the Taliban recently established the “Pamir” district for the Kyrgyz ethnic minority.

CONCLUSIONS: To better understand the Taliban’s role in Central Asia, it’s crucial to examine their balancing act between China and Russia, two regional powers with different interests. While China seeks stability in Afghanistan to secure trade routes under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and prevent extremism near Xinjiang, Russia focuses on managing the security risks spilling over into its Central Asian sphere. The Taliban, in turn, is strategically leveraging its position as a buffer state, engaging both countries diplomatically while positioning itself as a key player in regional security.

Since retaking power, the Taliban have pursued economic diplomacy, reassuring Central Asian neighbors of border security and promoting trade expansion. This shift has redirected Afghanistan’s trade partnerships from Pakistan toward Central Asia and Russia. The Taliban have leveraged Afghanistan’s geographic position to sign infrastructure MoUs, including railways and transit corridors, inviting regional investment in large-scale projects.

Central Asian states are balancing their engagement with Afghanistan while securing their interests. However, ongoing security risks, potential shifts in Taliban leadership, and external geopolitical pressures could alter the region’s engagement strategy. Future developments, such as increased intelligence cooperation or shifts in global economic alignments, may further impact Afghanistan’s regional role.

AUTHORS’ BIO: Aigerim Turgunbaeva is a journalist and researcher focusing on Central Asia. She writes about press freedom, human rights, and politics in the former Soviet space, and delves into China’s interests in the region for publications like The Diplomat, The Guardian, Reuters, and Eurasianet. Dr. Fayazuddin Ghiasi is a Rumsfeld Fellow and senior Researcher on Afghanistan and Central Asia at the Centre for Afghanistan and Regional Studies. He writes about regional geo-economics and geo-strategy, connectivity and politics in various national and international news outlets and journals.  

By Anna Harvey

In a January 2025 interview with Ana Tili newspaper, Kazakhstan's President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev outlined his vision of Kazakhstan as a middle power balancing relations between global powers while pursuing domestic reforms. The analysis examines how Tokayev has moved to separate himself from his predecessor, Nursultan Nazarbayev, implementing constitutional changes, economic reforms, and foreign policy shifts following the January 2022 events, while facing the complex challenge of maintaining independence from both Russian and Chinese influence. Tokayev’s leadership marks a new stage of Kazakhstan’s development, positioning the country as an independent player on the global stage.

Photo by Vladimir Tretyakov

BACKGROUND: On January 3, 2025, the President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev gave a written interview with Ana Tili newspaper reflecting on 2024 and discussing Kazakhstan’s future. In the interview, Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's role as a "middle power" globally; its ties with the U.S., Russia, and China; Nazarbayev's legacy; economic development; and Kazakhstan's future goals. He also addressed the "January events," the January 2022 mass protests against gas prices that turned into an intra-elite fight and escalated into riots and violence.

In international politics, Tokayev expressed pride in Kazakhstan's "middle power" status, stating the country should "work collaboratively to build new, resilient bridges between conflicting geopolitical poles. Kazakhstan maintains support for the UN and other international organizations. Tokayev expressed optimism about relations with both the U.S. and China, noting Kazakhstan's willingness to support Washington regarding Ukraine and plans for extensive high-level dialogue with Beijing in 2025.

Regarding the former president, Tokayev characterized Nazarbayev's legacy as overwhelmingly positive and noted their strong relationship, including monthly phone calls. Despite his own efforts to reduce Russian influence in Kazakhstan, Tokayev expressed no concern about Nazarbayev's December meeting with Putin, describing such meetings as exchanges between "long-time friends and colleagues with much to reminisce about."

On the economic front, Tokayev praised Kazakhstan's progress while noting that "economic growth of 4 percent is insufficient." Rather than artificially holding exchange rates or micromanaging sectors, he stated his belief that the government should "ensure the stability and efficiency of the economy, the dynamic development of the real sector, growth in labor productivity, and the creation of high-quality jobs." He also supports recovering illegally obtained assets for reinvestment in education, infrastructure, and social needs.

Domestically, Tokayev highlighted extensive modernization projects in housing, roadways, railways, industry, and education. He also discussed the expansion of Kazakhstan’s social state: in 2024, the government began the National Fund for Children, where 50% of investment income from the National Fund of Kazakhstan will go to children's savings accounts for housing or education after age 18. Additionally, pensions, academic scholarships, and civil servant salaries were increased.  Tokayev also emphasized his government's rapid response to spring 2024 flooding and efforts to build a "Clean Kazakhstan" through environmental initiatives.

In response to a question about the January events, Tokayev affirmed that, had decisive actions “not been taken against the instigators of the riots and organizers of the coup, Kazakhstan today would be a very different country, with diminished independence and restricted sovereignty.” The January events in question began on January 1, 2022, and began as protests against hikes in energy prices in western Kazakhstan. These protests appeared to be co-opted into an intra-elite struggle pitting parts of Nazarbayev’s entourage, specifically in the security structures, against Tokayev’s government, and spiraled into violent riots. Tokayev responded by requesting peacekeeping forces from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) be deployed to suppress the rioters. In total, around 238 people were killed. Since the riots, Tokayev has used the memory of the events to support a number of governmental reforms, including strengthening the powers of parliament over the presidency. In his interview, the President encouraged citizens not to fall victim to disinformation related to the riots, and he later stated evidence of involvement from criminal groups in the January events was a driving force behind his efforts to strengthen law and order in Kazakhstan, a project labeled “Just Kazakhstan.”

IMPLICATIONS: Tokayev's interview reveals his continued efforts to establish an independent identity from his predecessor. Initially, Tokayev was depicted as largely a figurehead acting on behalf of Nazarbayev, in spite of clear indications that he was assertively pushing a reformist agenda against the resistance of elements of the “old guard.” Following the January 2022 events, he has made significant breaks from Nazarbayev's legacy through constitutional reforms, including stripping Nazarbayev's title of “Elbasy” (or national patriarch) and removing immunity protections for his family.

Further changes include increasing Kazakhstan’s presence on the world stage and decreasing reliance on Russia. Kazakhstan's “positive balance” policy (initially promoted by Tokayev in 1997, when he was Foreign Minister) has gained new significance, particularly following Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Tokayev’s condemnation of the invasion, acceptance of Russian draft evaders, and pursuit of alternative pipelines have established Kazakhstan as a middle power outside Russia's sphere of influence. Regionally, Kazakhstan has increased its influence through initiatives like the Turkic World Vision-2040 program.

Kazakhstan is Central Asia's largest economy ($261.4M GDP in 2023). Under Tokayev, the country is actively diversifying away from Russian and Chinese influence, especially as a result of Russia’s damaged reputation following the invasion of Ukraine and public skepticism toward Chinese business practices. Seeking alternatives, Kazakhstan has successfully attracted Western investment, particularly from the United States ($65B invested), which sees Kazakhstan as a potential alternate rare-earth supplier and strategic partner in the region.

CONCLUSIONS: President Tokayev has evolved beyond his initial role as Nazarbayev's chosen successor, building a distinct legacy as revealed in his Ana Tili interview. His vision for Kazakhstan's future emphasizes its role as a middle power, balancing engagement with the United States, European Union, Russia, and China to maintain political and economic sovereignty. Under his leadership, Kazakhstan has strengthened its position by expanding regional ties and diversifying its interests beyond Russia and China.

However, significant challenges remain. Kazakhstan must navigate complex domestic power dynamics, including potential resistance from remaining elements of the old guard and public discontent, especially regarding economic opportunities. Meanwhile, Russia continues to pressure Kazakhstan to limit its independent foreign policy, while public skepticism of Chinese influence constrains economic partnerships. The success of economic diversification and domestic reforms will depend on Tokayev's ability to manage these internal and external pressures while maintaining Kazakhstan's sovereignty.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Anna Harvey is a Researcher at the Central Asia and Caucasus Institute and the American Foreign Policy Council. She received a Master of Arts in Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies from Stanford University. She has written for Newsweek, the U.S. Army War College War Room journal, and Postimees newspaper.

By Vali Kaleji

By promoting its concept of "Chinese-style modernization" (henceforth CSM) China seeks to project an image of economic development and growth in Central Asia that is non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing, positioning itself as an alternative to both Russian and Western models. Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian states and the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic networks within the region. However, despite its foundations in Chinese tradition, Confucianism, a distinct interpretation of Marxism, and uneven development, China's model of economic development and CSM has yet to establish itself as the dominant paradigm in Central Asia.

BACKGROUND: The concept of CSM, formulated in the late 1970s, has gained significant attention among Chinese leadership and researchers since the start of this decade. The emphasis on distinguishing CSM from Western and Soviet models highlights the theoretical possibility of offering a new developmental perspective to other nations. It also encourages these countries to design independent modernization strategies tailored to their unique national characteristics.

As the world’s second-largest economic power, it is crucial for China to promote its model of development and modernization within the international sphere. In this context, the development and evolution of the concept of CSM are closely linked to other key concepts proposed by China over the past few decades, such as "Peaceful Rise" and "Peaceful Development," which offer alternatives to the dominant Western development model and modernization pathways. Since September 2021, Beijing has introduced no fewer than three “Global Initiatives” focusing on development, security, and civilization. Together with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), these initiatives now constitute the four pillars of President Xi Jinping’s “Community for a Shared Future” framework, which China promotes as a blueprint for “world peace and stability,” “a powerful driver of global development,” and a foundation for a “New World Order.”

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, during the transition from the Soviet development model to the Western one, the concept and model of CSM emerged as a potential alternative for Central Asian countries. While Western modernization paths emphasized liberal democratic values, transparency, a free-market economy, reduced state ownership, and the growth of private enterprises, CSM offered a different approach. It combined state control and ownership of key infrastructure with the expansion of private enterprises, notably without incorporating liberal democratic principles. The rapid and remarkable growth of China’s economy, its rising influence in global trade, and its emergence as the primary economic and trade partner of Central Asian nations—along with the One Belt, One Road initiative (the modern Silk Road) and the significant inflow of Chinese capital, labor, and companies into Central Asian markets—prompted Beijing to promote the Chinese modernization model within the region.

Given that CSM is rooted in China's authoritarian communist framework, it aligns closely with the secular authoritarian structures of Central Asian countries. This model, characterized by top-down development, differs from both Soviet and Western development approaches. Unlike the fully state-controlled development model of the Soviet era, it is not entirely government-driven, and unlike the Western model, it does not rely fully on private enterprise. Instead, it represents a hybrid system that blends state control with market-oriented mechanisms.

IMPLICATIONS: The CSM complements and strengthens China’s substantial investment and significant trade relations with Central Asia. Over the past 22 years, China has channeled approximately US$105 billion into the region through development financing, with the China Development Bank (CDB) serving as a key player in this process. By promoting CSM, Beijing appears to be aiming to stabilize and secure its investments while ensuring sustained commercial and economic influence in Central Asia.

Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, economic development and growth have been central to the political legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party, an approach that can appeal to the authoritarian leaders of Central Asia seeking to enhance their own political legitimacy. CSM aligns with the interests of the pro-Chinese oligarchic network in Central Asia, encompassing a diverse range of actors, from politicians to owners and managers of both public and private enterprises. While the Western development model, based on a bottom-up approach, emphasizes transparency, CSM, characterized by a top-down approach often associated with ambiguity, lack of transparency, and, in many cases, corruption, is particularly attractive to the region’s oligarchic networks and shadow economy. Moreover, the thousands of Central Asian students who graduate annually from Chinese universities under Chinese government scholarships—especially in fields such as economics, business, management, and finance—play a crucial role in disseminating and promoting the CSM throughout the region.

CSM also serves as a key element of China’s "soft power," its so-called "Chinese Marshall Plan," and "soft hegemonism" in Central Asia. It aims to offer a development model tailored to the cultural, national, and ethnic values of the region, complementing China’s growing economic and commercial influence. By promoting this model, China seeks to project an image of non-hegemonic, non-interventionist, and non-imposing development, positioning it as an alternative to the Russian and Western models. Additionally, the promotion of CSM plays a crucial role in China’s strategy to counter rising anti-Chinese sentiment and Sinophobia in Central Asia. In this context, a Chinese researcher suggests that CSM, as a new form of modernization, emphasizes "human modernization" as its distinctive realization. This concept reflects China’s efforts to present a soft, humane image of development and modernization. 

Yet CSM in Central Asia faces significant constraints and obstacles. This model stems from a unique approach rooted in Chinese traditions, Confucian principles, and a distinct interpretation of Marxism, making it difficult to replicate effectively in other regions, including Central Asia. Even in Southeast Asian countries such as Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand—nations with stronger linguistic, historical, and cultural ties to China—the Western model of development and modernization has emerged as the dominant paradigm. Moreover, CSM adopts an unbalanced approach to development, prioritizing economic growth while neglecting political development. This imbalance reduces its appeal, particularly among the middle class and educated young people in Central Asia, who tend to favor parallel development and embrace the values associated with Western liberal democracy.

Furthermore, several additional obstacles hinder the establishment of CSM as a dominant and unrivaled model in Central Asia. These include widespread anti-Chinese sentiment, along with ethnic and religious sensitivities, particularly regarding China’s policies in Xinjiang. There is also significant criticism of the performance of Chinese companies and contractors operating in Central Asia, particularly concerning issues such as labor discrimination, where Chinese workers are often given preferential treatment over local workers, and Beijing’s debt trap diplomacy in the region. 

CONCLUSIONS: Although China has been the leading economic and trade partner of Central Asian countries for the past two decades, its economic development model has yet to establish itself as the dominant model in the region. Three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia continues to struggle with selecting a definitive development and modernization pathway. Various aspects of the Russian, Chinese, Western, and even the Turkish model—particularly after the Justice and Development Party came to power—have been adopted to varying degrees, but no single model has prevailed. Instead, the region operates within a mixed or hybrid framework, characterized by a blend of government control and authority, free-market principles, corruption and shadow economies, private sector activity, and foreign investment.

These circumstances are the outcome of a complex interplay of factors inherent in societies transitioning from tradition to modernity in Central Asia. Key among these factors are the challenges of reconciling religion, traditions, and ethnic and national beliefs with the demands of development and modernization, as well as the region’s unique political-economic structures. Additionally, the lack of consensus among leaders and ruling elites regarding the selection of a specific development model further complicates the process. The economic, financial, and commercial interests of the oligarchic network and the shadow economy also play a significant role in shaping the region’s developmental trajectory. To address or obscure these contradictions, regional leaders often emphasize the creation and promotion of a distinct, indigenous model of development and modernization tailored to their specific national contexts.

AUTHOR’S BIO: Vali Kaleji, based in Tehran, Iran, holds a Ph.D. in Regional Studies, Central Asian and Caucasian Studies. He has published numerous analytical articles on Eurasian issues for the Eurasia Daily Monitor, the Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, The Middle East Institute and the Valdai Club. He can be reached at   This email address is being protected from spambots. You need JavaScript enabled to view it. .